Brussels and Washington under pressure

by Ralph Bosshard, Lieutenant-Colonel EMG*

(7 February 2022) On 17 December 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry published draft agreements on mutual security guarantees between Russia and NATO,¹ as well as between Russia and the United States.² Initial comments from Western governments and the press have been reserved. The Russian proposals, which reflect some of the fundamental characteristics of Russian military thinking, do indeed require careful consideration.The mere fact that Russia has issued two separate proposals is already making ingrained transatlanticists say that Russia is trying to dissociate the United States from European security issues. The growing tensions in East Asia, where NATO has no presence, make such an approach necessary.

It is gratifying to note that Russia apparently continues to regard the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the main collective security organization. The fact that three of the five documents mentioned in the draft agreement between NATO and Russia were drafted within the framework of the OSCE shows that Russia wishes to stick to the achievements of the OSCE. It is a pity that some Western European states treat this instrument with a certain lack of respect.³

The proposed measures to avoid potentially dangerous incidents at sea and in the air are long overdue. The recent incident over the Black Sea, in which a U.S. reconnaissance plane came dangerously close to a Russian airliner, showed more than clearly the risks of the current cat-and-mouse game across the seas.⁴

Of course, the Kremlin would also like to see an end to Western “freedom of navigation” operations, in which warships enter disputed territorial waters. Nevertheless, it is logical that the West would like to make it clear that it still considers the territorial waters around Crimea as Ukrainian. However, this objective would also be achieved if unarmed ships entered the disputed waters. This would not result in any significant additional danger to an unarmed ship, as warships are severely limited in the use of their sensors during a so-called “innocent passage” and are therefore, if not blind, at least myopic.⁵

Renouncing NATO enlargement

The renunciation of the stationing of troops of the “old” NATO member states before 1997 on the territory of the “new” member states, as demanded by Russia, should not mean a decrease in security for the latter, if the deployment of troops for the defense of these states can be prepared and exercised, as is currently the case for Belarus. Every year, Russia and Belarus organise joint military exercises for this purpose.⁶ If such exercises are monitored by international observers on both sides, the nervousness should also be limited. The instrument for such verification missions is in principle available in the form of the OSCE “Vienna Document”.

The proposal to renounce the deployment of short- and medium-range missiles in Article 5 of the draft treaty should be seen as an offer to Eastern Europeans, who fear that they will be the scene of a nuclear intervention if the current new Cold War escalates. It is possible that they feel the same fears as during the Cold War in the two German states. At that time, it was feared that the superpowers would agree on an armistice after a devastating nuclear war in Germany.

It should be noted here that Russia is proposing NATO to renounce the deployment of short- and medium-range missiles, but not to prohibit their development and construction. A reactivation of the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] is illusory, as the United States understandably wishes to retain the option of developing medium-range missiles, as China has never been prevented from doing so by a corresponding treaty. This is understandable. What is dishonest is to blame Russia for the end of the INF Treaty.⁷

Of course, ingrained transatlanticists will reject the request to renounce the admission of Ukraine and other former Soviet Union republics into NATO because, according to their reading, every country should have the freedom to choose its alliance. It is questionable whether Cuba really had the freedom to choose its defensive alliance and to deploy troops and weapons during the Cold War.

The demand for new members would still be acceptable if NATO were the same defensive alliance as during the Cold War. But since the end of the Cold War, NATO as a whole and the major NATO member countries have waged wars of aggression contrary to international law.⁸

It is conform to the Russian mentality to take the necessary measures even before a potential conflict breaks out, so that an aggressor is forced to launch an attack under unfavourable conditions. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Litvinov and Ambassador Maiski, had already pursued a strategy of encircling National Socialist Germany for this very purpose.⁹ For Russia, which always had to expect wars on two or many fronts in its history, such thinking is not surprising.

With its proposals on military exercises in Article 7, Russia is also pursuing the legitimate security interests of its allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), including Belarus. Like the United States, Russia cannot afford to expose an ally that has so far not threatened its neighbours in any way.

In the draft treaty with the United States, it should be noted that Russia proposes to renounce the deployment of strategic weapons – including nuclear weapons – outside its territory. This would presumably also mean an end to patrol flights by strategic bombers.

On the other side, accepting such a proposal would lead to the withdrawal of all remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe and thus to the end of the nuclear sharing of Western European countries. Nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France, however, would not be affected. The latter must be seen as a Russian concession to these two states, and the former seems all the more urgent as there has already been talk of a nuclear participation of Poland, which would probably not be acceptable to either Russia or Belarus.

Conclusion

Overall, Russia has proposed a series of measures that are likely to provoke divergent reactions from different Western countries. Some will talk about Russia’s attempts to split NATO.

NATO was created in 1949 to counter a perceived threat at the time and was forced to justify its continued existence after the end of the Cold War. The potential division of NATO is more a result of its enlargement after 1998 than of “Russian propaganda”.

In the coming weeks and months, Russia may try to put pressure on some NATO countries through military exercises and show tentative membership candidates that NATO could not protect them militarily either. But it will probably be enough if the Kremlin refuses to accept a revision of the Minsk Agreements for the settlement of the conflict in and around Ukraine, as well as the development of the Vienna document for confidence- and security-building measures. This should be enough for now.

Ukraine will protest most vigorously against Russia’s proposals. One wonders whether it will succeed in convincing the whole of NATO to reject the Russian proposals. This is where we will see how far the West is prepared to go with Kiev. By rejecting Moscow’s proposals, NATO would cast a poor light on itself. Brussels and Washington are forced to react.

* Ralph Bosshard was a career officer in the Swiss Army, including instructor at the General Staff School and Head of Operations Planning at the Army Joint Staff. After training at the General Staff Academy of the Russian Army in Moscow, he served as Special Military Adviser to the Swiss Permanent Representative to the OSCE, as Senior Planning Officer in the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and as Operations Officer in the OSCE High-Level Planning Group. In civilian life, Ralph Bosshard is a historian (Master’s degree, University of Zurich). We thank him for this very objective and expert assessment of Russia’s draft agreements of 12/17/2021.

Source: https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=79226,  21 December 2021
With the kind permission of the editors and the author.

(Translation "Swiss Standpoint")

1 See the draft treaty on the Russian Foreign Ministry website in English at https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en&clear_cache=Y. There is no need to criticise the fact that Russia is talking about NATO member countries and not about NATO itself. The former are subjects of international law, but NATO as such is not.

2 ibid. at https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en.

3 It should be recalled that in the context of the conflict in/around Ukraine, NATO countries started in 2014 to hijack the so-called OSCE “Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures” to establish a permanent presence of NATO officers in Ukraine. Subsequently, Russia prevented the development of the Vienna Document, the current version of which is available online at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/e/86599.pdf. The Open Skies Treaty was denounced by the US in November 2020. The other NATO member states did not follow suit. See Zeit Online: „Open Skies Abkommen, Nato-Partner verwehren USA die Unterstützung“, 22 May 2020, online at https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2020-05/open-skies-abkommen-nato-treffen-usa-rueckzug. The text of the treaty is available online at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/7/14129.pdf.

4 A Russian Aeroflot airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Moscow on 3 December was forced to make an emergency change of flight altitude near Sochi due to the “reckless actions” of the crew of a US Air Force reconnaissance plane; see. https://twitter.com/attilaXT/status/1467150527368728580.

5 About restrictions during an “innocent passage”, See: Eleanor Freund: “Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide”, in: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, online at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide. While the US hasn't ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it enforces it worldwide.

6 This is what happened during the “ZAPAD” exercises of 2017 and 2021. Regarding the “Zapad-21” exercise, see the official information of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense at https://www.mil.by/ru/news/137264/ and of the Russian Ministry of Defense at https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12378427@egNews (both in Russian). See https://cepa.org/russias-zapad-21-lessons-learned/. According to information from the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, within the framework of “Zapad-21”, Russian troops of the 1st Armored Army were in Belarus in the number of 2,498 soldiers, with 72 battle tanks, 40 armored infantry fighting vehicles and 51 artillery pieces or multiple rocket launchers (MLRS).

7 As the German Foreign Office does. See home page of the Foreign Affairs Ministry : “End of the INF Treaty”, online at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/themen/abruestung-ruestungskontrolle/aus-inf-vertrag/2236922. Prior to the US denunciation of the treaty, reciprocal accusations about its alleged violation had been made for years. See “U.S. Department of State’s Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament”, Washington, 14 April 2017, online at https://www.state.gov/2021-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.

8 For example, according to the Swiss government, the air war campaign against Serbia in 1999 is not covered by a necessary decision of the UN Security Council. See “Swiss Neutrality Practice - Current Aspects - Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group" of 30 August 2000, p. 8f, online at https://www.eda.admin.ch/.
The report avoids the term “aggression contrary to international law”, but in substance there is little doubt. See „Quittung für den Kosovo-Einsatz. Krim-Invasion ist
völkerrechtswidrig“, on NTV, 4 March 2014, online at https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Krim-Invasion-ist-voelkerrechtswidrig-article12390256.html, and Goran Goic:
„Es gab nur schlechtere Alternativen“, on Deutsche Welle 10 June 2009, online at https://www.dw.com/de/es-gab-nur-schlechtere-alternativen/a-4315179. Other NATO-led interventions against Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, to name but three examples, are highly controversial from an international law perspective.

9 About Litvinov, see entry in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia online at http://bse.sci-lib.com/article070721.html, in Russian. Maiski‘s journals were published in 2016. See Ivan Maiski: „Die Maiski-Tagebücher. Ein Diplomat im Kampf gegen Hitler“. 1932–1943, Ed. by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Munich 2016; reviews online at https://www.perlentaucher.de/buch/iwan-maiski/die-maiski-tagebuecher.html. See Marti : „Diplomat Iwan Maiski. Im Pelzmantel für die Weltrevolution“, in: Spiegel Politik, 10 September 2016, online at https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/diplomat-iwan-maiski-tagebuecher-aus-dem-zweiten-weltkrieg-a-1112000.html.