Italy

Italian general calls for an end to the Ukrainian conflict

Fabio Mini. (Photo ma)

“Permanent war in Europe is America’s preferred scenario”

Interview with General Fabio Mini* by Alessandro Bianchi

(4 April 2023) “As far as the U.S. is concerned, a permanent war in Europe, alongside one or several States volunteering to fight it indefinitely, has a twofold advantage: keep the Europeans fighting Russia and distract them from their ties with Beijing. But as I write in my book, ‘volunteers’ for endless war are gradually running out, starting with those meant to be sent to the front.”

These are the words of General Fabio Mini, author of “Europe at War” (Paper First, 2023), when asked by the publication “l’Anti Diplomatico” about the role of the United States in possible future peace negotiations.

Fabio Mini is one of Italy’s most persistent and powerful voices when it comes to denouncing the risks associated with the European attitude towards the current conflict. With his articles in “Limes” and “il Fatto Quotidiano” he has succeeded in countering the prevailing opinion. That propaganda which, as the General himself aptly predicted, is bringing our continent closer to an ever clearer abyss.

* * *

l’Anti Diplomatico: General, while reading your latest book, I was struck by the title: “Europe at war”. You have the courage to say this clearly, even though the media try every day to cover it up with sometimes surrealistic fantasies. Has the European Union (and therefore Italy) committed itself to an active belligerent status by supplying weapons to Ukraine?

Fabio Mini: The status of Europe’s participation in the war isn’t just about sending weapons, and it isn’t just about the time frame of the current active conflict. The war in Ukraine began much earlier in the Donbass with the “war against Russian-speaking terrorism” trope.

In this war, waged with weapons of internal repression, civil war and massacres of innocent people, the EU sided with the Ukrainian government from the very beginning, and even before it began. Believing this was “only” an internal affair, Europe nonetheless imposed sanctions, supplied weapons, and re-equipped and restructured the Ukrainian army – the same army that had been destroyed by the separatist movement in 2015.

People displayed an open indifference to the affected population and supported a Ukrainian regime composed of people who until a short time before were considered dangerous neo-Nazis. All channels of psychological warfare and cyber warfare were activated. The EU imposed wartime censorship upon the European population and built up militia forces from mercenaries and international “volunteers”. In light of such wars, the weapons supply is almost insignificant, although it accounts for the largest part of Western contributions.

You write a very important passage in your book: “The fashionable vulgate is always the same: the West fights for good and democracy, against evil and autocracy, for freedom, human rights and prosperity, against dictatorship, abuse and poverty. It fights because it is in the right: because there is an obvious goal and a chosen people, a hegemon and many vassals.” But don’t you think that the conflict in Ukraine has given a clear message to the West that the rest of the world no longer accepts this self-declared dichotomy?

Very true. But this western world does not seem to realize it yet. Countries making up three-quarters of the world’s population abstained from voting on the first 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the war – and yet that vote was portrayed as a victory of good over evil. Since then, the U.S. and EU have continued to fuel the war in Ukraine, trying to persuade at least some of these countries to reconsider their position.

The second UN resolution of 2023 was also presented to us as a comprehensive victory of “good”. In reality, it did confirm the first resolution, but the number of abstentions was much higher, demonstrating the failure of the pressure, promises, courting and threats exerted by the so-called Western world upon the rest of the world.

There is no need to revisit the origins of the conflict in 2014. Your articles have brilliantly elaborated on them on several occasions. In your latest paper, you outline five principles and 10 action plans to “rekindle hope”, assuming only a first step by Russia and the U.S. can defuse the situation. Do you think the current U.S. administration will really deliver on that hope?

Frankly, no. But there are conditions that transcend even the will of the rulers. I am not talking about the will of the people, which the so-called advocates of democracy mouth and direct to where they want it to be with the help of controlled polls and “election forecasts”.

I refer primarily to the impact of the war on their own interests. The U.S. was able to persuade its allies and EU countries easily that the war would be short-lived and that economic warfare would bring Russia to its knees. However, this was not the case, and President Biden is no longer convinced that he can play the victory card and defeat Russia within a year.

What remains is the road map of reconstruction by big business, which could actually help the American and European economies now in obvious distress. But even this does not coincide with Biden’s electoral horizon and the Euro-Atlantic economic collapse. Ironically, Europe’s reconstruction and rearmament could end up suspending operations in Ukraine for the time it takes to do so, only to return to destruction afterward.

It is a diabolical cycle, but if we think about it, it has been going on all over the world for a long time. The current war in Europe may have shortened but not interrupted it.

Of the principles you listed, I think one is at the very heart of the problem in the medium to long term. “The resolution of the conflict must allow the creation of a new security structure in Europe that is not exclusively based on armed threats but aimed at eliminating all causes and pretexts for territorial conflicts.” Is our continent doomed to decades of destabilization without a security project that incorporates Russian demands into an overall framework?

Of course, this is the most plausible scenario and the one preferred by the West. As far as the U.S. is concerned, a forever war in Europe, alongside one or several States volunteering to fight it indefinitely, has a twofold advantage: keep the Europeans fighting Russia and distract them from their ties with Beijing. But as I write in my book, “volunteers” for endless war are gradually running out, starting with those meant to be sent to the front.

At present, the battlefield is focused on the city of Bachmut, which Ukraine has decided to defend at the cost of enormous loss of life. Is it so strategically important? And what would its capture bring to the Russians?

Almost nothing. Bachmut is a symbol for the entire Donbass, just like Mariupol, which was destroyed and conquered by the Russians and is now being rebuilt despite the conflict. Economically, Bachmut represents one of several important centres, not so much and not only for Russia and Ukraine, but mainly for the independence and autonomy of the self-proclaimed republics.

It has been heavily destroyed for this reason. The republics have aligned themselves with the Russians, but they do not particularly want to become an object of plunder, as they were for Ukraine or the USSR. There is also the military aspect: the lightly armed Wagner group fights in Bachmut, while the Russian army prepares for the advance and in the meantime fires at more distant targets throughout Ukraine.

“General Winter” has already retreated this year. The classic winter frost, which would have allowed the tanks to advance on hard ground, has failed to appear, and the “Rasputin mud” is already present. The western tanks with their 70 tons are already facing big problems. Lowering the tracks by about 20 centimetres is enough for them to touch the ground with their bellies and stop moving. They have to move on the roads, which makes them even more vulnerable. Less heavy Russian tanks would have a better chance, but the longer the Ukrainian army is engaged in Bachmut, the more time there is to prepare an offensive. On both sides.

More generally, we are also looking with concern at what is happening on another red line for Moscow. Is there really a danger of a second front opening up in Georgia?

That is what the US and its allies want. It is a trap, but Russia could be lured into it even then. The probability the West is bluffing over Georgia and Transnistria and that the U.S. would not intervene in practice, as they have in the past, is very appealing. And should it not be a bluff, Russia would still be left with the possibility of a direct conflict with NATO, which, contrary to the opinion of its strategists, cannot be limited to a “conventional” confrontation.

Generally speaking, the term “new world order” is fashionable again today. Can the non-aligned countries again play a role in the current crises comparable to the days of the Bandung Conference in 1955? What other blocs can conceivably serve as alternative alliances for peace and negotiation in crises?

I do not believe that a non-aligned movement like the one in Bandung, which after all indirectly contributed to balancing out opposing blocs, will be revived. Not only because of the political differences among the various “nonaligned” States, but because no structure or ideology is actually needed to abstain. Just as there is no need for treaties and alliances and associated constraints to express dissent. This approach is still used by the U.S., NATO, and the EU. And it is “outdated”.

The new world order will not be decided upon in New York, Washington, or Brussels. Russia, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, the Arab countries and the countries of the Middle East, as well as dozens of other countries that make up three quarters of the world’s population and almost 90% of its economic resources, are already a reality that does not fit the idea of blocs. Nor is it a sign of chaos because they offer alternatives that are independent of the diktats of the bloc’s guardians. The so-called New Order is merely the realization of this reality.

The ongoing pacification of the Middle East, as a result of the U.S. withdrawal and China’s diplomatic role, has taken an important step with the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume diplomatic relations. What impact will this have on the conflict in Europe?

I doubt whether this is an appeasement, a withdrawal of one and a diplomatic role of the other. Regardless of external pressures, the agreement shows that the parties involved have recognized the irrelevance of their respective ideological positions and have put them aside in the face of their own interests. It is also proof that linear and symmetrical political agreements and alignments no longer reflect reality and no longer “seal the deal” for anyone. It is proof that opportunities for cooperation are greater with this logic than with the permanent conflict we have been fed for a century.

* Fabio Mini, born in Manfredonia in 1942, is an Italian lieutenant general. He was commander of KFOR from 2002 to 2003. He assumed commanding responsibilities at all levels of the Mechanized Force, from platoon to brigade. In a later duty assignment, he led Operation Sicilian Vespers against organized crime in Sicily. Furthermore, Mini led the preparation, training, and deployment launch of the “Legnano Brigade” in Somalia. Mini served as S3 (training) and NBC counterintelligence officer for the 4th Armored Regiment in Bellinzago Novarese, and as G4 (logistics) officer for the Ariete Armored Brigade in Pordenone. From 1979 to 1981, he served in the United States with the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, as G3 officer in charge of planning and operations, deputy G3 officer in charge of training and evaluation, and senior G3 officer of the Combat Simulation Center. Upon his return to Italy, he served on the Army General Staff as a staff officer in the Personnel Division, as Chief of the Public Relations Office, and as the Press and Information Officer of the Army General Staff. From 1993 to 1996, he was posted as Military Attaché to Beijing. As a major general, he served as director of the Army Command and Staff College (1996-1998). In January 2001, he was assigned by Allied Forces Southern Europe to command Allied Forces Balkan Operations.

Source: https://www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-generale_fabio_mini_a_lad_la_guerra_permanente_in_europa__lo_scenario_preferito_dagli_stati_uniti/5496_49054, 16. März 2023

(Translation “Swiss Standpoint”)

Go back